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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAUL F. ROST,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

vs.
Case No. 15398
JANET L. ROST I
Defendant/Appellant

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
APPEAL FROM ORDERS OF HONORABLE JOHN F.
WAHLQUIST AND FROM FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND DECREE OF HONORABLE RONALD 0. HYDE,
BOTH SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY,
UTAH.

SAMUEL KING
301 Gump & Ayers Building
2120 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Attorney for Appellant.
PETE N. VLAHOS
244 7 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Respondent.
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SAVING CLAUSE
~ounsel

has written and rewritten this petition six times.

The strong language is intended solely to get the attention
of the court.

It is counsel's gamble that he might offend the

court, weighed against the necessity of stating the matter so as
to get that attention.
Domestic law is in a state of evolution.
to this.
laudable.

Utah is not blind

The court's recent decision in Wilkins v. Stout was
It opens the way to thoughtful consideration of out-

side assets, as the wife's inheritance, or the husband's vested
retirement plan, that now stand as major and unresolved problems
at the trial level.
Counsel has already used that opinion three times at the
trial level, and it has been most helpful to the judges.
In the case at bar, the two issues raised are issues where
counsel and courts sorely need guidance.
Most domestic cases, even on appeal, involve who gets the
table and who gets the cloth.
This case, though, has not one, but two, issues whose
thoughtful resolution can be of inestimable benefit.

For that

reason, counsel casts the dice and makes his gamble.
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APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appellant, through her attorney, Samuel King, respectful!;
requests the court to grant rehearing.
When an attorney takes the time to submit a thoughtful
brief to the court, he should be reasonably able to expect that
the court will render a thoughtful opinion.
The opinion in this case reads as if the opening page of
I

the brief, Statement of Points, was considered, these points on,
their face held not worthy of further consideration, and the

ca;

cursorily scanned and dismissed.
In fact, the case contains two very important issues.
court has not touched on these.

The'

In other words, with all due

respect to the court, it has missed the boat.
Probably the court is wearied of certain types of appeals,
such as writs for habeaus corpus from the Utah State Prison, or
domestic appeals which are merely perpetuated bickering of the '
spouses.
Last year in Salt Lake County, over 4, 000 domestic action:
were filed.

These cases involve an average of two children.

Accordingly, in Salt Lake County alone, 16,000 persons were in·
volved in the traunaand economic disaster of divorce in one year
7hat is an epidemic.
Because the judges in the state's populous areas are so
swamped with work, they often render poor divorce decrees.

Thi:

no Quinney
reflection
thefor digitization
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isthethat
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have
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time to master the entire fact situation.

Often, the judge's

emotional and physical exhaustion enters as a human factor.
It was to this very epidemic nature of domestic litigation
that the two important points in appellant's brief were addressed.
The first point was the issue of when abatement is appropriate.
This case is a good example of why domestic judicial discretion should follow the criteria applied by Utah in other civil
cases, but never clarified in domestic cases, which holds that
a case should proceed in the state which is "best suited" to
hear the entire case.

(See Brief P29; Annex 2, P6)

The result here, by denial of Mrs. Rest's motion for abatement, was that she was required to go to court to try CHILD
CUSTODY ON THREE COURT DAYS' NOTICE FROM THE TIME THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY WAS RAISED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT NEITHER SHE
NOR THE PARTIES' CHILDREN HAD EVER RESIDED IN THE STATE OF UTAH,
THAT SHE WAS KNOWN TO BE ENTIRELY WITHOUT FUNDS WITH WHICH TO
TRAVEL ACROSS COUNTRY TO APPEAR AND DEFEND, AND THAT ALL WITNESSES WHO KNEW HER AND THE CHILDREN, AND EVEN THOSE WHO KNEW
THE HUSBAND IN HIS SETTING AS FAMILY MAN, RESIDED IN DIFFERENT
STATES, NOT ONE RESIDING IN THE STATE OF UTAH.

(Caps to draw

attention)
These facts are spelled out in detail in Mrs. Rost's Brief
on Appeal in the Statement of Facts at pages 6-9, in Point II at
pages 28-32, and in Annex 2 (Her Interlocutory Appeal) at pages

1-12.
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Mrs. Rost prays the court review these portions of her
Brief before proceeding with this petition.
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court stated simply that
abatement was not a matter of right, the state of first filing
I

having the power to proceed.

Had it had one sentence in it con-

cerning the facts, it is doubtful if the point would have been
dismissed in such horn book fashion.
The fact of the Utah trial court ',s power to deny abatement
was not in issue.

Of course, it had the power.

The issue was, what criteria should the trial court use in'
ruling on such a motion?

What discussion of this issue is there

in the appellate opinion?
Following that, her prayer for relief was that she be free(
to proceed to enforce the decree, if such should be necessary,

in New York.

This prayer is overlooked in the appellate opinion.

It was stated in the section on Relief Sought on Appeal (Brief ·
page 1) and in her Summary (Brief page 32) , factually explained
at pages 9-10 of her brief and argued in Point II, pages 28-29.
Our society is transitory.
great frequency in domestic cases.

This generality applies with
Following the break-up ofa

marriage, it is common for one spouse to leave the state of resi·
dence as part of the process of leaving the home, going home to
mother, seeking greener pastures, or simply escaping.
Accordingly, the issue of sound criteria for abatement, or
declining

jurisdiction, is one that can be raised at trial
Most decis1:

It is byatheproper
issue.
ofLawtimes
each foryear.
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will turn on what best serves the children.
The present Utah law and some other states is almost FIFO.
First one to the courthouse wins.
This case is a classic example.
Had Major Rost honored his sworn Separation Agreement, Mrs.
Rost would not have contested the divorce.

It was his unilateral

rescision, with no announced cause, that compelled her to file
in New York to try to hold him to the agreement.
How the case came on for trial setting so rapidly is dif ficult to determine particularly when Major Rost had (1) filed no
reply to Mrs. Rest's answer and counterclaim; (2) the plea in
abatement had not been heard; and (3) he had not asked for custody
in his original complaint.
When Judge Hyde heard the case, he commented that the prior
judge had been attempting to "push the matter to early hearing."
There is conflict in the law as to which state has the
primary decree, based on whether first filing is the criteria or
first decree is the criteria.
It seems that Judge Wahlquist's purpose in "pushing" the
case was to prevent Mrs. Rost from having time to obtain a "first"
decree in New York.
This kind of race to be first has nothing to do with justice.
To the contrary, it means that the courts will act so quickly and
implusively that they will rule without considering merits.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for
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Judge Wahlquist is an experienced judge, but human.
had met the Major twice, and the

~1ajor

culate man of military bearing.

He had not met Mrs. Rost.

He

is a fine looking, arti-

Clearly, the judge thought that he was not going to send
that dedicated soldier cross country to fight a divorce on
foreign turf.

But by dealing with the known,the Major, in

preference to the unknown, the wife and children, he forced
them to that which he wouldn't make the Major do. This, though
all witnesses relative to custody were also in

~ew

York.

To nail it down, the judge exceeded his authority.

He

terminated Mrs. Rost' s support as of the trial date which he
set the next week, three court days away.

This forced Mrs.

Rost to (1) trial in Utah or (2) starve.

That relief had not

been asked.

He did it sua sponte.

What a help it would have been for her counsel if he couk
have argued, as Judge Wahlquist is a student of the law, "Your
honor, the Utah Supreme Court has set criteria for abatement.
Let's compare them to the situation here."
Doubtless the judge would have followed the law.

It was

the lack of such law that freed him to go unhindered by anythint
but his visceral reaction, i.e., discretion.
Mrs. Rost prays the court consider, and rule on, domestic
criteria for abatement, and in process of that, free her to pre·
ceed in New York should it ever be necessary.

-5-
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Turning now to the second major issue, which the Utah
supreme Court also overlooked, which is whether the Separation
Agreement terms concerning property should not have been honored
by the Utah court.

The opinion states, "There is no claim that the award of
alimony and support for the minor children is inequitable or that
the court abused its discretion in making the award.

It is only

asserted that the court should have followed the agreement made
by the parties."

Pages 11 through 15 of Mrs. Rest's brief on appeal are a
precise accounting in which Mrs. Rost showed that the Separation
Agreement terms were equitable, and that Judge Hyde erred in
not following them, so that his ruling was not equitable.
The essence of what happened is that Major Rost had reduced
his total indebtedness (even though he had bought all new furniture on credit) from the time of the Separation Agreement to the
time of trial, so he could actually live with the agreement.
What he did though was run up extreme "short term" debt, by
using credit to pay his regular expenses, rather than using cash.
His many credit charges were substantial.
Accordingly, he showed himself at the moment of trial, in
a position of being cash short because he showed a substantial
monthly cost of living, together with a great deal of short term
indebtedness, both of which he had to meet each month.
-6-
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Consider the ingeniousness of that.
for a month or two or, without design,

If I charge everyth_

I habitually always spet

my income before I receive it, relying on the time lapse before
my credit charges reach me, I can duplicate my expenditures.
That is, I have my monthly cost of living, then I also have my
short term indebtedness.

However, they both cover the same gro

the monthly cost of living.
Facts supporting this argument were further spelled out

1

the Statement of Facts within Mrs. Rest's Point I.

She did not claim 9n appeal that the court should have h1
ed the Settlement Agreement with such words being in a vacuum.
She said it, and proved it, because the Settlement Agreement
terms were fair, so that revising them was unfair.
Judge Hyde made no findings of change of circumstance si
the Separation Agreement had been made.

He just found thatMa

Rost' s then total monthly expenses were so high that he would
have trouble meeting them and also paying the amount required
the Settlement Agreement.

In doing that though, Judge Hyde (a

it must be remembered that the case started in late afternoon
and finished that evening on the day before Thanksgiving becat
of its rush to trial), didn't have the time to segregate and
realize how and why Major Rost' s total monthly expenses had bi
inflated, such inflating having nothing to do with his actual
monthly need for money on a long term, regular basis.

That i

if he had paid his short term debt on the schedule he listed,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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he would speedily have retired it and then had that money as
pocket cash.
Included within this factual issue was the larger issue of
law and policy stated in detail at Point I of Mrs. Rost's Brief.
The appellate opinion conceives this issue to be whether
New York law had to be applied in a Utah divorce trial.

It

naturally said "no."
Unfortunately, Mrs. Rost never claimed that.
issue.

It was not an

If a pun may be allowed, such is not the case.
The issue was the weight to be given prelitigation settle-

ment agreements.
In the ordinary commercial case, if the contract says the
law of a particular state is to be used, such will be followed
by the trial court.

However, this rule is incompatible with the

overriding duty of a domestic judge to do equity--he can't be
blindly bound.

It would seem such provision should be considered

carefully and the foreign law reviewed, but followed only if consistent with equitable principles.
Mrs. Rost avoided that issue because of its complexity.
Instead, she based her point on much stronger ground.

This is

the legal standing of a settlement agreement itself.
In most states of the union, prelitigation settlement agreements are strongly encouraged.

They are the vehicles by which

parties considering divorce can give the marriage one more try.
While husband and wife are in that comparatively thoughtful stage
Sponsored
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their problems may not be solveable, they can work out a settlE.
ment agreement, i.e., "Okay, while we're trying to be nice to
each other, this is a good time to settle terms if we can't max,
it. It
If they live the agreement out, and if either of the parties relies in good faith on that agreement, what weight should
it be given in the courts?

That was the issue presented on app:

At the present time in the Utah courts, from counsel's pe:
sonal exl?erience with several thousand cases, settlement agreements are worth the paper they are written on.

The Utah Supren:

Court has announced some criteria such as "great weight."

It

has made some comments about contractual obligation, but it alw1
comes back to the unfettered discretion of the trial judge.
Compared to this, New York has announced specific criteria
Is there a finding of fraud or duress; is there specific evidenc
of gross overreaching at the time the settlement agreement was
made; was either party ignorant as to the agreement's terms; ha·,
the parties lived with the agreement for a substantial time; wL
the party who relied be injured if the agreement is revoked? !'
not, the sworn contract is to be honored.
Applying specific criteria will save judge time because fa
fewer cases will be tried, and with this save attorney fees whic
divorcing parties can rarely afford, and tremendous amounts of
emotional trauma.
New York law as cited because it is in harmony with other
states, and also the legal criteria the parties agreed to.

-9-
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This does not tie the hands of the courts.

If the specific

criteria to set the agreement aside are not present at the time
of trial, the courts can still, if there is a specific finding of
changed circumstance, modify the terms of those agreements as
under 30-3-5, UCA.
There was no adverse change here for Major Rost as his total
indebtedness had decreased and his income increased.

Mrs. Rest's

position was unchanged except that travel and suit costs put her
in debt.
The gap in the Utah law is that the trial judge has no distinction made by existing Utah law between later change of circumstance, and simply his feeling that in hindsight, the agreement
should be changed.
It also has no distinction between settlements hammered out
in the heat of litigation and those carefully drawn before litigation commences.
There are many truisms about 20-20 hindsight, all true.
Worse, we are tempted to use it.

The New York concept of judicial

restraint has something to commend it.
It is because of this undefined judicial discretion that
separation agreements are entirely unreliable in Utah.
Because they are unreliable here, Utah law encourages litigation to avoid them.

This not only ties up the courts, it

teaches people not to trust contracts, nor to trust the courts
which interpret them.

Are these results desirable?
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Let us apply these theoretical arguments to actual situa:
A typical case might be a wife who by nagging and whinb:
makes the husband entirely responsible for her happiness ("Its
your fault I'm not happy, John.

11
)

,

yet no matter how

efforts, she never lets him succeed.

valiant~:

She is happy really

beca~

everything is her way,but he feels himself to be a miserable
failure, a man who is not able to gain the love or respect of
his wife.
As an alternate example, the husband tells the wife that
he has provided her with children and a good home, so she is i:.·
debted to him.

("Most women would be grateful for what I give

you, Marsha, so don't tell me what to do.")

He then spends ail

of his free time and money with a golf club or girl friend in
hand.

The neglected wife is in despair.
In the marriage counselor's term, the "dynamics 11 of the

relationships are out of balance, so that one party's needs are
being fulfilled at the sacrifice of the others.
Both example marriages give the children a picture of wh:
marriage is based upon

what they see at home.

This view of a

flawed reality creates poor odds that these children in their

'.J

will have good marriages.
The unhappy spouse sees an attorney in a mood where theY
· remair·
can , t survive as an effective person or parent i· f th·ings

as they are, but desperately wishing to improve their marriage
rather than destroy it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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At least half of counsel's divorce cases involve people
forced to divorce, rather than wanting it.
As matters now stand, the attorney refers them to a reputable counselor or their clergyman and cro.sses his fingers.
usually return in due time to obtain the divorce.

They

Sometimes they

remain in the unhappy marriage with nothing improved, setting a
tense, unhappy, atmosphere for the children to grow in.
Alternatively 1,

suppose the attorney draws a settlement agree-

ment, using as his tool to bring the dominant spouse in, that this
is the only alternative to divorce.
The economics of a settlement agreement are pretty much
self declarative.

A sharing of assets and income timed to meet

the needs of the children first and the parties second, and an
allocation of debts based on ability to pay.
In this objective, professional -setting, the parties see
two things that they often don't see in the smoke of the conflict
at home.
One thing is financial, and the other personal.
The financial aspect is that the divorce per se greatly increases the cost of living.

Duplications will occur in housing,

telephone, electricity, water and gas.
returns will be lost.

Tax advantages of joint

The wife, no longer being an "insured" in

health policy terms has to get a separate policy.
might be required if she has to work.

Babysitters

Furnishings, linens, and

all kitchen equipment must be duplicated.

Car insurance goes

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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onto separate policies at higher rates than as a package, etc.
If the husband has a take-home of $2,000.00 a month,
$1,500.00 of it meeting family needs, and $500.00 being unbudg:
he now sees that half of his income goes to the family and ha!'
to himself.

However, out of his half he has to pay the duplk

expenses and the outstanding debt.

He can make it, and for the

welfare of his family will have to make it, but suddenly his
financial freedom is gone.
The wife, on her part, has to run the house and raise th:
family on $1,000.00 instead of $1,500.00.

With today's presen:

home interest rates and food costs, the ordinary family

wi~

children needs that sum just for the basics of food, housing,
and utilities.

Where is the money to run the car, buy

or take tlE kids to Lagoon?

clo~es

She too will have to cut back seve:

The personal thing that they see, especially the spouse•"
has the upper hand, is that they will lose all the emotional ac
vantages and status that their home and marriage offer.

Oncec

of that relationship, where are the volunteers to serve their
emotional demands as the other spouse has done?
The wife will be a "divorcee."
empty apartment.
sequences.

The husband goes home to

They frequently remarry just to avoid thesec

The study done by the recent Family Court committe:

showed a shocking 75% of remarriages end in divorce in Utah. '"
bad to worse for the spouses and kids.
Counseling is not too effective unless both parties have
th

doesn't
powerful
change.
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bottle until he is motivated.
Now the counselor can do his work.
The dominated spouses will have to look at the weakness of
their pattern by which they slid from a healthy effort to make
the other spouse happy to appeasing at a sacrifice of self.

The

dominating spouse will have to look at their contribution to a
marriage that has become superficial and one-sided, rather

than

an intimate relation based on trust and sharing, which latter they
make impossible by their self indulgent life styles.
This realistic appraisal of what a person's needs really
are, and how they might be met within a marriage, is often rewarding.

The "dynamics" can change.

They frequently do.

Also, frequently the dynamics don't change.
divorce is proper.

If so, the

In that event at least, the divorce can be

easy because the terms are already set.
Professional counseling is used in the examples.

Many

people adjust for the better without it,provided the motivation
is present of either changing their ways or divorcing.
men are often effective.

Clergy-

Also effective is a person just look-

ing at the cold reality of his options, like the smoker who can
never kick the habit until the doctor tells him he is a candidate
for a stroke.
There is a lot of hypothetical in the above that the reader
might question.

There is also a lot of reality.
-14-
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If the divorce is filed before the foregoing steps, by'.
very act, damage is done, the parties polarize to protect the,.
economic ends, and many marriages go into contested li tigatio:,
What happens is that the "thinking" time is replaced by
"litigation" time.

The cart is before the horse, the parties

suing first, and thinking second which is often an irreversibl'
mistake.
Miracles can't be worked.

There is no guaranteed solutt

for unhappy marriages.
The gravamen is odds.
ed by motivated parties.

Assume 10% of divorces might be a:1

(Counsel's own experience puts it higi.,

with at least one marriage out of three being improved to the :1
where both parties wish to stay married.)

Assume another 10%

can avoid domestic court contest by use of the settlement agm
ment (the variability of this figure depends on the weight give
these agreements by the trial courts and, dependant on that, t:
frequency with which they are used as an alternative to filing
divorce).
Now, apply these percentages, or whatever percentages the
reader chooses, to the 4, OOO divorce cases in Salt Lake County·
1978, to determine what any beneficial percentages mean in tet:'
of saving judge time, or in terms of saving marriages.

Go ahea

Use your own figures and calculate the numbers, particularly if
you go statewide for 10 years.
The benefits, it is submitted, justify a judicial policY
favoring prelitigation settlement agreements.

Such a policy,:
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words only, will be futile because, as words only it already
exists and is futile.

Counsel says it is futile because he has

tried a number of cases with ante-nuptial or prelitigation agreements and, as here, not one agreement has stood up.
The judicial policy must be implemented by strong, clear,
criteria

announced by our state's highest court. These criteria

beneficially combine the concepts of the sanct:i.W of marriage and
the sanctiey of contract.

Such criteria must supercede the pre-

sent unlimited judicial discretion, replacing it with criteria
that are more reliable and precise, such as those which have proved
successful in our sister states such as New York.
Appellant respectfully requests that the court reconsider
her brief, its opinion, and direct oral argument if it feels it
appropriate.
DATED February 12, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL KING
MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Petition
for Rehearing to Pete N. Vlahos, attorney for plaintiff/respondent,
2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, postage prepaid, United
States mail, February 13, 1979.
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